Several recent studies propose that political choices of Indian youth can hardly be distinguished from those of their parents in many respects. Contrary to this well-established understanding, this article shows that when set apart from the spheres of family and work, students in a flagship Indian universitymostly in the social sciences and humanities-gradually transform their political attitudes in light of prolonged exposure to a campus environment. Through combining ethnographic study with the analysis of a survey of political attitudes of Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU) students, we show that time spent in situ fosters participation to political activities, increases chances of joining a student organization and make students more likely to identify themselves as politically radical. The class and caste background of students, on the other hand, are not strongly associated with political attitudes, showing the integrative nature of politicization on the JNU campus.
Introduction
Recent survey studies 1 show that in many respects, political choices of Indian youth can hardly be distinguished from those of their parents. Contrary to this well-established understanding, this article shows that when set apart from the spheres of family and work, students in a flagship Indian university-mostly in the social sciences and humanities-gradually transform their political attitudes in light of prolonged exposure to a campus environment. The article provides a case study of the everyday politics of Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), a prestigious postgraduate and residential "central university" 2 in New Delhi. We build our argument by combining ethnographic evidence drawing from 16 months of fieldwork with quantitative analysis of novel survey data.
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influence the attitude of new cohorts. A setting such as JNU facilitates the formation of intergenerational political kinships often at odds with one's previous worldview. Sustained activist competition and rivalry, channeled by well-organized student organizations, create multiple incentives for progressive partisan identification. While caste, class, and community identities partly mediate political subjectivities and the meaning-making of students, these markers alone do not drive the political participation. In the present case, student politicization inclines toward inclusiveness, even though women and upper-class students tend to be less affected by it. The diachronic process which enables the acquisition of new political values cannot be separated from the development of increasingly complex networks of loyalties and friendships involving student activists. These figures appear to be crucial authorities on campus, as they also turn out to be seniors, bhaiya/didi (brother/sister, also friend), councilors, patrons, and fixers. The political impact of these leaders is further legitimated by activist-professors, who often have an analogous background in student activism and share both mentorship of affiliated participants and the ideological narratives of common students.
This ethnographic study proposes a portrayal of the ordinary course of micro-politics on campus without reducing it to an electoral game. We make the epistemic choice of inferring from daily instances of political participation rather than on exceptional occurrences of political unrest. In order to present a parsimonious picture of the encompassing effects of prolonged campus presence, the article does not provide an exhaustive account of the ideological cleavages between the various political student groups found at JNU. The aim is to reveal that the politicization experienced by various student communities on campus is pervasive and goes beyond ideological divides.
The picture presented by the ethnographic study is then tested on survey data that the first author has collected in the first semester of the 2014-15 academic year. Through the empirical analysis, we find that time spent as a JNU student is positively associated with self-reported political radicalization, the likelihood of membership to a political organization, and participation in political events. These findings are robust to various model specifications. Even when we control for age, the number of semesters spent studying at JNU is a significant predictor of politicization. Overall, the empirical analysis is highly consistent with the ethnographic study. Based both on our work in the field and the empirical analysis of the survey data, we propose that exposure to the JNU environment profoundly influences students in terms of political attitudes and behavior.
The rest of the contribution is structured around two main sections. The article first provides a brief overview of the literature on student and youth politics in the world and in India, while discussing the historical endurance of the political culture at JNU. It then presents the ethnographic study carried out by the first author. The section outlines the central role of peers and professors in the passing down of political values and practices.
Next, the paper substantiates the argument by quantifying the politicization at hand. Informed by the ethnographic analysis, we formulate four testable hypotheses. We continue with the empirical analysis of the original survey data, which shows strong support for our arguments.
Explaining youth political attitudes: The unresolved "primary vs. secondary socialization" debate One of the most reliable findings in survey studies conducted in Western countries is that political partisanship is mostly influenced by childhood socialization, and often gains strength over the course of a lifetime. 3 As Inglehart notes, "a large body of evidence indicates that people's basic values are largely fixed when they reach adulthood, and change relatively little thereafter." 4 Most quantitative accounts looking at lifetime trajectories stress the importance of the worldview of parents in the development of political attitudes, 5 which subsequently display stability across the phases of adulthood. 6 These studies concentrating on pre-adult value transmission in the family show that parents have more influence than professors and peers regarding political attitudes. 7 Recent political science scholarship shows the limits of the persistence model of political socialization, which emphasizes the crystallization of political personalities before adulthood. Alternatives propose that certain young adults are particularly open to changing their early acquired political perceptions in consistence with both the life-cycle model and the impressionable years model. 8 The latter approach claims that individuals are attracted to certain attitudes at specific life junctures, such as conservatism at the age of retirement and radical ideas at a young age. 9 The former shows that the zeitgeist and the Lagerung 10 could influence a whole generation, 11 thus forging collective memories of often traumatic events, such as French youth during the Algerian war and the protests of May 1968 12 or young Americans during the Vietnam War. 13 The current youth in Western democracies commonly display mistrust for institutions and representatives, leading to decreased voting turnout and partisan allegiance, a lack of belief in political narratives, and greater involvement in participatory forms of democracy. 14 The work of Percheron identifies three possible roles of education in shaping the political attitudes of students. 15 The content of educational classes determines to a certain extent the student's understanding of institutions and norms of one's society. School is also a place where certain democratic mechanisms are learned through the election of class representatives and school councils. 16 Almond and Verba showed the efficiency of school participation in the preparation for political life. 17 Finally, school is the place where individuals learn to develop certain forms of horizontal social relations with peers. 18 The scholarship challenging the persistence model usually supports the notion that university impacts socio-political attitudes, because students socialize with each other. 19 University provides free spaces to cultivate alternative ideologies 20 and to interact with mates from diverse cultural and social backgrounds. 21 Our study proposes that local contexts such as campus spaces influence political preferences; 22 thus, we are keen to emphasize the transformative impact of interpersonal relations. 23 This approach is at odds with most behavioral studies in the United States that consider political attitudes to be a product of "personal" calculus, irrespective of the individual's immediate social environment. 24 Challenging this approach, the recent literature focusing on biographical consequences of social movements has been less hesitant to acknowledge the importance of place on the selective socialization of youth cohorts. According to this line of research, commitment to political activities may not only involve political learning, 25 but also the opening up of new life chances 26 and the acquisition of new identifications, 27 in turn fostering the institutionalization of grassroots protests. 28 Personal transformations are accompanied by shifts in political imagination 29 and religious orientation. 30 They trigger feelings of "satiety" over victorious issues 31 and are accompanied by a phase of cognitive liberation often prefiguring political mobilization. 32 Sustained political participation does have long-lasting effects on the lives of its protagonists. As summarized by Giugni, 33 follow-up studies of American New Left student activism show that social movement activities have profoundly affected their biographies, which appear to differ significantly from those of nonactivist cohorts. Even years after the events, former activists displayed more radical ideologies and greater participation in conventional politics and protests. These studies acknowledge the long-lasting effects of collective exposure to political environments. Within these settings, cohorts of participants build distinct collective identities. 34 Campus socialization is thus fueled by a dual process of assimilation and expectation building. 35 For the purpose of our study, political socialization can be defined as a continuous, multi-situated and processual interaction 36 in which Indian youth develop new understandings of society, gender, labor, caste, history, and self-identity. Social movement scholars argue that the comprehension of politics changes overtime and that youth university students are more likely to experience such ideological refashioning. Youth is seen both as a distinct phase of development and a period for expressing cultural agency, 37 where individuals incorporate a secondary form of habitus, internalizing new orientations to action. 38 When marrying, starting employment, or registering as a university student, a youngster is likely to resettle and socially adjust to unknown environments. In the case of university education, the individual is a stranger in a new academic environment and "is about to transform himself from an unconcerned onlooker into a would-be member of the approached group." 39 Because of the rapidly changing roles experienced during early adulthood, we can confidently say that discontinuities in political behavior and attitudes are more likely to occur in this time period than later in life. 40 
Introducing the politics of indian educated youth
In the aftermath of the 1968 student movements around the world, explanations of student mobilization in the Indian context stressed mostly sociopsychological factors. Some authors focused on generational conflict between parents and dependents 41 while others emphasized the weakening of traditional authority structures 42 and the alienation of youth from the decisionmaking processes of political institutions. 43 These reductionist approaches, while looking at youth as a transformative phase of life, did not explicitly question the empirical processes at work in gradual campus politicization.
As Shah summarizes, the literature on student movements in India is scant after the 1980s and full of "stray observations, wishful thinking and personal anecdotes." 44 Most of the work focusing on so-called "student indiscipline" portrays student behavior as an unchanging given. Such accounts depict political participation by youth either as a component of party politics 45 or as a pathological aspiration for agitation. 46 Recent scholarship emphasizes the lack of ideological character of South Asian student politics after the anticolonial 47 nationalist movement . 48 It often depicts joining a student branch of a political party as a way to secure one's personal interests, such as a seat in a student hall, 49 or to accumulate private networks for business opportunities at the local level. 50 Student politics is understood within the framework of patronage where leaders, 51 aligned with political parties, indulge in goondaism (criminal behavior), 52 violent disturbances 53 and caste-based brokerage, often involving lucrative mediation between university administrations and private contractors. 54 Political participation is viewed as an instrument for future leadership in national or regional politics. 55 Often derided by students as opportunists or sycophants (chamchas), 56 student leaders (netas) are associated with "dirty" politicians and blamed for their careerism, 57 their dishonesty, 58 and their corruption. 59 Political actors themselves, however, tend to depict Indian youth as potential force of agitation against the establishment. 60 Various manifestos and press releases of Indian Communist and Maoist parties emphasize the rebellious nature of students. 61 According to these views, student political activists carry an inherent but mostly latent ability to reject mainstream careerist party politics. As a former general secretary of the JNU students' union declared, students can "acquire a heightened or radical consciousness through ideological engagement and praxis in order to transform aspects of society through the political process." 62 Post-independence student radicalism is associated with the anticorruption movement led by former freedom fighter Jay Prakash Narayan (termed the JP movement) in Bihar in 1974 63 and to the resistance against the decision of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to impose internal Emergency. 64 Peasant-oriented Maoist rebellion in the late 1960s in West Bengal attracted academically accomplished 65 and highly educated urban youth. 66 Students also substantially supported the 1965 anti-Hindi protests 67 in Madras state (today's Tamil Nadu) and participated in the movement for the creation of the state of Telangana, including the 1952 Mulkhi (local) agitation and more recent mobilization leading to the formation of the state in June 2014. 68 Nevertheless, when looking at the pan-Indian picture, patterns of youth politicization remain unclear. The third round of the Youth Survey 69 indicates that when it comes to politics, youth tend to be undistinguishable from senior generations. The offspring of parents who take interest in politics are more likely to be interested in politics than youth whose parents do not have any interest. 70 The lack of distinctiveness of youth politicization in India is confirmed by the work of Kumar. 71 By analyzing five parliamentary elections covering the period 1996-2014, he proposes that there is no voting pattern for youth when compared to subsequent generations. He also shows that politicized youth are not led by their educated sections. Both 2006 and 2016 survey rounds show the endurance of absenteeism in which the voting turnout of illiterate youth exceeds that of graduates. College-educated young women in India participate less than nonliterate young women and the upper class records the lowest level of electoral participation overall. 72 To sum up, educational experiences of Indian youth do not seem to significantly increase their 'political consciousness' in the long run. This sits at odds with the literature on youth politics in the Global South which portrays youth as a politicized life-stage. 73 More specifically, studies on student movements in various countries acknowledge the leading role taken by elite universities 74 and, in particular, those in the social sciences. 75 Through looking at the way JNU students become socialized into politics, we demonstrate that this university is coherent with the global picture but might stand as a special case in the Indian political landscape. Accordingly, the first stage of the following analysis engages with the history of youth activism at JNU and scrutinizes how rivalrous political cultures of the left have taken root on campus for more than four decades.
Political legacy of JNU in historical perspective
On its inauguration day, November 14, 1969 , the Indian National Congress leader and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi wished that Jawaharlal Nehru University would become an institution "conducive to social change." 76 Batabyal shows how, in the wake of India's socialist and secular zeitgeist, many appointed professors in disciplines such as History, Economics and International Relations abided by the leftist credos defended by the party in power and its political ally of the time, the Communist Party of India (CPI). 77 However, it did not take long for JNU to become an antiestablishment and anti-Emergency 78 84 Commentators, whether enthusiasts or skeptics, usually consider JNU from its inception as a leftist landmark in Indian politics. It has been recognized as an enduring Marxist bastion, 85 a space of academic and political dissent through debate and discussion, 86 a place where professors preach new-left ideologies, 87 and an environment in which activism is an integral part of student life. 88 Data collected by the first author indicates that most of the JNU student representatives are affiliated to political organizations; only less than 20 percent of the elected presidents of the JNU Student Union were supported by independent platforms (see Table 1 ). This is consistent with the fairly long legacy of political alignment and mentoring on campuses across the country. 89 Such tradition took roots in the 1930s when the National independence leaders such as Subhas Chandra Bose and Jawaharlal Nehru started using student forums both as a recruitment agency and as a platform to pressurize the Congress toward more separatism and militant positions. 90 This approach was soon emulated by the then united Indian communist party that took control of the main organized body of students at the All-India Students' Conference in Nagpur in 1940. 91 After independence, various new political outfits created their own student wings in order to gain control of university campuses. Table 1 shows the organizational strength of various communist parties in the JNU campus; it also reflects the ideological divisions of Indian communism, which resulted in various splits in the past half-century.
JNU politics is, however, not exclusively the prerogative of secular politics, and student groups with ethnic nationalist ideologies can also be found. 92 For example, in October 2014, a raucous campus protest was organized by Hindu nationalist groups such as the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP -the Indian Students' Association), a student outfit associated with the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS -the National Volunteer Corps). The protests followed a seminar on "Mahishasur Shahadat Diwas" (Mahishasur Martyrdom Day) by a group of Dalit and Other Backward Classes (OBC) students, 93 who described this mythological figure (traditionally portrayed in Hindu mythology as a demon from the Yadav caste killed by goddess Durga) as an allegory of upper caste social oppression. 94 More importantly, the implementation of new affirmative action mechanisms (referred to as "reservations") in higher education has led to a fierce resistance. 95 In 2006, a new campus-based political outfit, Youth for Equality, particularly active at JNU, emerged in opposition to caste-based reservation and in support of "merit" 96 and the enforcement of admission quotas based exclusively on economic and gender disparities rather than on caste divides. 97 This followed the Congress-led government decision to extend reservation for OBCs to educational institutions funded by the central authorities. 98 Before 1990, an existing 15 percent reservation for Scheduled Castes (SCs) and 7.5 per cent quota for Scheduled Tribes (STs) was in place. 99 A section of the upper castes at JNU and beyond reacted furiously to this measure; according to some reports more than 150 students attempted to immolate themselves in different incidents of protest across India. 100 While the distinctive political character of JNU is an established fact, the reasons for its endurance over the years -amid a changing,and increasingly hostile political landscape -remain uncertain. Thus, we are now interested in describing how cultures of participation at JNU are potentially reproductive, notably through the daily actions of microcohorts of activists.
Passing down of a culture: A qualitative account of political socialization in JNU
The historical record of JNU student politics indicates that a section of JNU students, whether right-wing or left-wing, display ostensibly high levels of politicization. When visiting JNU, it is easy to witness that cohorts of activist students personally engage with political issues on an everyday basis. Interviews and accounts of politically active residents indicate that they attach political meaning to various university spaces. It is where students "have planned revolution as well as found romance" says Sandeep Singh, former Student Union president. 101 Kavita Krishnan, 1995 JNU Student Union Joint Secretary reflects on her experience at JNU; "for an introverted and intensely private person, it was exhilarating to discover a world of warm solidarity, collectivity, and comradeship created in the course of late-night debates at the dhabas (food stall), marching in torch-light processions, writing leaflets and organizing movements. 102 Professorial contributions to the political debate are also apparent. The JNU faculty often recruits academics who were politically active during their own education. Based on our research on the patterns of JNU activism, Table 2 shows that about half (48.6 percent) of those who had held important Student Union positions during their student life joined academia after graduation. Data was collected and crosschecked through conducting interviews of former JNU student leaders. 103 This passage of politically active students to academic positions also contributes to the reproduction of an environment that values political discussions, both in classes and in evening canteen meetings. One JNU professor reflects that "so for me having been a student activist, it was a natural transition to being a teachers' activist." 104 Another crucial aspect lies in the fact that the everyday routine at JNU tends to abolish the distinction between social and political activities on campus. Political events organized under the banner of student organizations include various leisurely venues that cannot be seen only as part of a preelectoral campaign. Reading and music events, film screenings, street plays, memorial lectures, and workshops are organized on a nearly daily basis and involve a high degree of intra-organization competition. 105 Pamphlet distribution and poster-making also play an important role in student interaction. For instance, during the year 2015 only, there were a total of 392 posters posted on the walls all around the campus. Most journalists also occupied teaching positions but were not in the category "Academic." The "Other" category comprises mostly licensed professionals, public officers, and a few entrepreneurs. Those who are still registered as students as of 2017 (23 of them) and those whose profession could not be identified (12) . The Table does not add up to 100% as a result of rounding. Source: fieldwork.
Beyond electoral politics, political organizations aspire to occupy public spaces and provide political interpretations of cultural and religious artifacts such as festivals (e.g., the Hindu celebration Durga Puja), Hindu scriptures, popular cinema, or flag hoisting on Independence Day. As a senior activist puts it, "there is no pause in the political game" 106 and this puts most proactive activists under constant pressure, as they need to reach out all day and all night long.
Acknowledgement of political effervescence can take various forms; one activist-professor of JNU talks about a space of conscientisation; an elected leader boldly claims that JNU "taught him everything." 107 Ethnographic evidence shows that activists constantly relate to JNU as a founding experience in their political apprenticeship. As a former JNU student reflects, "Jawaharlal Nehru University is always a Dickensian scenario. Imagine 1968 Paris being repeated over and over again -the slogans, the sexual liberation, the orgasmic enthusiasm for revolution, the wild dreams." 108 There are critical moments in the academic year in which the processes of socialization and politicization are so entangled that they become inseparable. We describe in the following paragraphs how these "moments" relate to the day-to-day activities led by activists for students facing various kinds of hardships, administrative conundrums, and personal adversities. JNU activists' patronage and readiness to address student issues -which are fueled by the hope of generating sustained political loyalties -can be considered one of the principal mechanisms of politicization on campus.
During the ten-day registration period when newcomer students officially sign-up for their programs of study, activist students make their initial contact with the arriving students. Activists welcome newcomers by offering help to get acquainted with the JNU campus as well as by providing assistance for the red-tape necessary for registration. Competing cohorts of activists camp in front of the administrative offices for the so-called "registration assistance." 109 The official rationale behind this is to facilitate the bureaucratic work for registration, but it also gives activists the opportunity to establish ties with the newcomer students.
At a more individual level, activists appeal to the administration when scholarships are not paid on time or when an administrative deadlock prevents a student from completing a bureaucratic task. Student activists, especially those who have held Student Union offices, may book lecture rooms for student seminars and public events, help students to shift their hostel (dormitory) rooms, influence decisions on campus shop-allotment, and put students in contact with the appropriate administrators depending on their query. They can also speed up diverse administrative queries. Discourses on the administration are acrimonious but interpersonal relations with administrative personnel need to be harmonious in order to "fix" student demands.
Some activists are also perceived as authoritative elders. These activists have the implicit responsibility to solve personal problems of students, including various kinds of conflicts. Issues might be related to family pressure, academic performance, sentimental spleen, intimate partner violence or injuries. Becoming a student activist at JNU is not only about getting involved in student politics; it is also about incorporating human skills that enable oneself to act like a mentor for students. In this respect, the task of assisting individuals at a personal level and mass mobilization of students become complementary, if not intertwined. Reflections of a former activist highlights this aspect; "after some time, you have internalized that the rule of the game is to keep contact with people until it reaches an amazing level. It is not like a last minute tactical plan to talk to people and get them to vote. If you want to ensure participation you need to keep contact with students all the time." 110 As the following quote suggests, campus activists are not only promoting ideals in line with their ideology but also behaving as middle-men or "street level bureaucrats" 111 who are ready to assist students -though sometimes reluctantly -in their mundane personal queries. As it appears, campus activists at JNU give away their time and energy in the hope of securing political loyalties. They do not solely carry out patronagedispensing acts out of genuine concern and empathy for student problems. They are also conscious that if they do not deliver, the individual will seek assistance from rival activists. In this sense, it is possible to spot similar variants of JNU campus activists elsewhere in Indian politics who assume the role of an intermediary. Such brokers are central to how Indian democracy operates, 112 and the democratic space of JNU is no exception to this general pattern. As Piliavsky and Berenschot identify, 113 patron-client relationships in the South Asian context are not only a matter of redistributing resources, they are also a rhetorical act that convey largesse as a politician's virtue.
As supported by the two quotes that follow, clientelist features of student politics at JNU provide crucial mechanisms for recruiting new members as well as for building connections at the individual level, thus activating the process of political socialization. A student activist who has held offices in a political organization reveals his process of stepping into student politics: "I got involved in JNU politics for petty reasons. I wanted to shift to Narmada [hostel name] and leave the cranky room in Mahi Mandavi. The AISA 114 activist helped me to do that, and through prolonged discussion I got into politics." 115 This suggests a complex political socialization process that involves in part patron-client relationships based on receiving benefits in exchange for giving loyalty.
Political groups at JNU are successful in recruiting new committed members through creating ties of solidarity and friendship with the younger generation. Socialization, in this sense, plays a crucial role in the formation of a collective identity and the progressive familiarization of the newcomer into the group. 116 The enlarged group would campaign in teams, enjoy free time together, drink alcohol in the secrecy of a comrade's room, and even get high under the same tree on the day of Holi (festival).
A second "socialization moment" entailing practices of micropolitics is tied to the practice of "room sheltering." Because of the rapid expansion of the number of students in the past decade, the amount of free spaces available in the 17 hostels of the campus is increasingly insufficient to host all the new incomers. Many freshers, therefore, end up in the rooms of activists who generously offer them some space where they can stay until they are allotted a hostel room.
One SFI senior was sheltering two freshers in his room. They were becoming sympathizers slowly, slowly. But he was not setting an example. He was ordering pizza every day instead of going to the mess and meeting common students, interacting [ At the beginning of the academic year, an activist can shelter up to four new students. This situation usually lasts for months and provides an influential space for personal discussions on political matters. Student leaders introduce their value system to the new arrivals and encourage them to participate in public events. Only after his first week at JNU, Akhil, a newcomer student staying in the room of a senior activist, declared to the ethnographer that "we are having a protest at bloc this afternoon." Akhil's choice of the word "we" shows how he has already identified himself as a member of a politically active group. Later in the month, the first author would meet the fresher Sunil near Godawari tea stall. Sunil would confess that it was his first time ever putting a political poster of AISA on a wall. Later on, the ethnographer would meet him several times in the hostel room of a dynamic cadre of the same organization, where he stays with three other new students. Socialization, once again, acts as a vehicle of politics and vice-versa.
Campus appears here as a safe territory 117 in which JNU students are exposed to new political languages and understandings of society. 118 Freshers are invited to loci amoeni and havens; 119 these pleasant closed spaces enable individuals to express their personality and to learn the political line of the organization through loosely structured face-to-face discussions with affiliated seniors. The setting is formally nonhierarchical but the authority of the senior prevails and the junior learns quickly the specific knowledge and the lexicon legitimizing the political credos of a specific organization. Respondents often refer to influential political activists as elder brothers or sisters when they are asked to recall their own consciousness-raising process.- 120 Before concluding the discussion on the centrality of socialization in fueling politicization in JNU, we turn to the analysis of survey data in order to quantify the phenomenon at hand.
How much more political? quantifying political socialization at JNU As the preceding qualitative discussion suggests, student organizations at JNU generate a process of political socialization, which is pursued through both patronage relations and sustained interactions with newcomer students. In this sense, student organizations contribute to the fashioning and the reproduction of politicized microcohorts 121 and produce political gains. Overall, one politicized cohort of senior political activists helps in forging a new one.
The ethnographic part of this study highlights the mechanism, but it does not tell how widespread the political socialization is. 122 In other words, is political socialization experienced only by a small proportion of JNU students or is it a broad phenomenon? If this mechanism is widespread among JNU students, then we should be able to observe differences among students based on how long they have been exposed to the JNU environment. Similarly, students who reside on campus are more exposed to the political environment at JNU than those who reside off-campus. As a result, oncampus residents should have a higher level of politicization than students living off-campus. Following this line of thought, we formulate and test the validity of four hypotheses based on the ethnographic study.
Hypothesis 1: Exposure to the JNU campus makes a student more likely to self-place herself in a radical position on the left-right political spectrum.
Hypothesis 2:
Students who have been studying longer at JNU are more likely to become members of a political organization.
Hypothesis 3:
The longer a student has been studying at JNU, the higher the likelihood that she participates in political events.
Hypothesis 4:
Students who are living on campus are more susceptible to politicization than those who reside off-campus.
Research design
We are interested in the effects of continued exposure to the JNU campus on the political attitudes of students. In this sense, our treatment is exposure to the JNU campus. One possible approach is to compare political attitudes of JNU students with non-JNU students or the larger population. However, such an approach essentially introduces empirical problems because the treatment is dependent on enrollment at JNU, which is not randomly assigned. In such an empirical design, students would have self-placed themselves in the treatment group by choosing to enroll at JNU.
As conventional wisdom and our previous fieldwork suggests, some students join or refrain from enrolling at JNU precisely because of the political environment at JNU. To circumvent this selection problem, we limit our population to JNU students and compare JNU students with other JNU students. Our treatment, exposure to the JNU campus, is measured as time spent at JNU, in terms of semesters. We expect that those JNU students who have spent more academic semesters at JNU are more likely to become politicized.
Our theoretical expectations are tested on a survey carried out in the JNU campus over six weeks in the first semester of the 2014-15 academic year. It was conducted by the first author and all of the respondents were JNU students. Although the medium of education in JNU is English, a simple English language was adopted to ensure that comprehension was not an issue. The questionnaire was restricted to a single (double-sided) page in order to encourage participation by keeping the questionnaire short. It consisted of 15 structured and two openended questions. Respondents were briefed, and it was emphasized that all responses were strictly anonymous. The questionnaire was filled by the respondent and placed in an opaque ballot box.
The questionnaire was distributed in every student hall on campus. In addition, over six weeks during the first semester of the academic year 2014-15, five visits to four types of locations were made: (1) all the university libraries, (2) all the 15 university buildings where teaching takes place, (3) all the school canteens, and (4) the main squares/forecourts and vicinities of on-campus tea stalls. A time-slot was randomly assigned (in terms of the day of the week and time, considering only teaching hours) for a visit to a location. In addition, a more specific locality was randomly assigned if the location was a large building such as a main library or teaching center. For example, we visited teaching building A and delivered questionnaires on Tuesday at 10:00 a.m. in the classrooms located on the second floor.
Outcome variables
(1) Self-Placement on the Political Spectrum
We rely on a question in our survey that asks respondents to self-place themselves on the left-right political spectrum. The respective survey question is depicted in Table 3 .
Based on this question, we create two outcome variables for testing our first hypothesis. Our strategy is depicted in Table 4 . First, a binary variable labeled Radical takes a true value for students who placed themselves on 1-3 or 8-10 and false otherwise. Second, we create an ordinal variable, called Radicalization, which measures how far the respondent is from the center. We define answers 5 and 6 as the center of the political spectrum. Accordingly, answers 4 and 7 are considered relative centrist; 3 and 8 are relative radical; 2 and 9 are radicals; 1 and 10 are extreme radicals. We consider those who respond as "Don't know/No opinion" as nonradical and nonpolitical. However, excluding these responses from the analysis does not change our results, as shown in the online Appendix. 
We propose that exposure to the JNU campus makes a student more likely to become a member of a political organization. In order to test this hypothesis, we rely on a question in the survey that asks respondents whether they are a member of a political organization or not. We build the outcome variable Membership based on this question.
(3) Participation in Political Events
Our final hypothesis proposes that exposure to the JNU campus makes students more likely to participate in political events. In order to test this hypothesis, we rely on three questions in the survey that ask participants how frequently they participate in, donate to and organize political events. Based on these questions, we build an ordinal variable labeled Participation that categorizes the level of participation. The five categories of Participation are depicted in Table 5 .
Main explanatory variable
Our main explanatory variable is exposure to the JNU campus, which is measured in semesters of study as a JNU student. We present our results in number of semesters for easier interpretation, but different functional forms for study time, including natural log or a quadratic term do not change our results. As some postgraduate students spend more semesters at JNU, distribution of this variable is highly skewed. There are a few outliers (2.25 percent of the respondents) who spent more than 12 semesters at JNU. Dropping or including these respondents do not change our results in a meaningful way. We illustrate our results with these outliers lumped at the value 13 for the semester of study. The number of students in their odd semesters is also considerably higher than students in their even semesters (irregular students) because the survey was conducted in the first semester of an academic year. In order to make sure that this imbalance does not introduce estimation problems, we also considered academic years of study. Again, our results do not change whether we measure academic years of study or semesters of study. We present the models with alternative measures for study time in the online Appendix. Our ethnographic study suggests that on-campus dormitories are hotbeds for political socialization. We have asked students whether they are living oncampus in student accommodation or residing outside the campus. Based on this question in our survey, we generate the variable hostel, which captures the residential status of the student.
Control variables
There is no recent quantitative study on campus politics in India. The last ones are the works of Pattnaik and Hazary, 123 who followed the legacy of previous surveys on Indian university students. 124 This tradition investigated the background of politically active students, their political attitudes and their organizational affiliation. Unfortunately, this literature does not provide an established baseline model to follow as it did not examine the impact of the university campus on political identities and participation. However, considering our experience of Indian campus politics we introduce several control variables that have the potential to influence political attitudes.
First, we consider the class of the respondent as potentially influential. We have several questions in the survey that can be used as a proxy for class. As these indicators provide similar results, we only present the level of education of the respondent's guardian/parent. Second, we control for meta-castesi.e., conglomerates of different jatis (castes) -by using the category of admission as a proxy. 125 We consider three main admission categories; general (nonreserved), OBC (Other Backward Classes), and SC/ST (Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe). In the Indian context, caste does not necessarily overlap with class or income, and it is imperative to differentiate social and economic stigmas. 126 Third, we control for whether the respondent's guardian resides in urban, sub-urban or rural areas. Fourth, we control for gender because gender can have an influence on political behavior. In line with other Indian scholarship, we strongly suspect that being female may have a negative impact on participation and membership. Fifth, the birthplace of the respondent is taken into account. We have clustered responses into seven categories; Northern states 127 (excluding the capital), Delhi NCR, West Bengal, Southern states, 128 North East, 129 Jammu and Kashmir, and abroad. 130 Sixth, we control for school of enrollment because the JNU campus might offer different experiences to students with different majors.
We acknowledge years of education and age as possible confounding variables. In our view, neither age nor years of education necessarily positively affect the likelihood of being a political radical, membership to a political organization, or participation in political events. Nevertheless, we include the degree of enrollment variable (undergraduate, master's level or MPhil/PhD) to capture the effect of years of education. Finally, we add religious beliefs in some of our models. Interpretation of this variable should be performed with caution because it is likely to introduce post-treatment bias; exposure to JNU might influence religious views. We also control for age as a robustness check to see whether any impact we might find would be washed away with the introduction of age. Our results substantively remain the same when we control for age (see the Appendix).
Analysis and discussion
Descriptive statistics of the variables of interest are provided in Table 6 . The main explanatory variable, the semester of study at JNU, ranges from 1 to 13 with a mean of 3.35 (the academic year is divided into two semesters). The variable is skewed to the left, which is compatible with the student population of JNU. Membership to a political organization is at 23 percent, and 44 percent of respondents place themselves on a radical position in the political spectrum. As many of our variables are categorical, summary statistics are not interpretable for all of the variables. We provide histograms for each variable in the Appendix in order to illustrate how the variables are distributed.
Political radicalization
As the first step for the empirical analysis, we test the hypothesis proposing that more time spent as a JNU student increases the likelihood of political radicalization. We use logistic regression on the binary variable Radical. We present our full model in Table 7 . We estimate that the average marginal effect of every additional semester at JNU on the likelihood of self-placement at a radical position on the political spectrum is 2 percentage points. In other words, every additional semester spent at JNU is associated with 2 percentage points increase in the likelihood of perceiving oneself as radical on average. This result suggests that a student who has spent 4 academic years at JNU is 16 percentage points more likely to self-place herself at a radical position on the political spectrum than a student in her first semester at JNU. Figure 1 illustrates the relationship between semesters as a JNU student and likelihood of radical self-placement. As semesters of study at JNU increase, the probability of drifting from "centrist" positions increases. The average marginal effect of on-campus accommodation on being in the radical category is 21 percentage points, which is consistent with our expectations. To better illustrate this effect, the average of the predicted probability of being in the radical category is 0.36, according to our model. Had no student Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1.
stayed in a hostel, the predicted probability is 0.18. Had everyone stayed in a hostel, the predicted probability is 0.39. The change of probability from 0.18 to 0.39 (0.39 -0.18 = 0.21) is the estimated effect of on-campus residence. We present the model in which we included our explanatory variables without an interaction term but the introduction of an interaction term yields the same substantive results. An interaction term between Semester of Study and Hostel would assume that students who are residing in campus accommodations in the first term of the 2014-2015 academic year have also been living on-campus throughout their education at JNU. This might be unlikely but even if we make this assumption, our results stay the same substantively. We do not find a statistically significant effect for parent's study level, gender, caste (proxied by admission criteria), level of study (undergraduate/postgraduate). Compared to respondents coming from an urban background, respondents with a rural origin are more likely to self-place themselves at a radical position.
Thus, it appears that self-perceived radicalization at JNU is an all-encompassing phenomenon regardless of caste, gender and school of enrollment. Nevertheless, students from rural backgrounds are more likely to radicalize than other sections of the student population. It is commonly accepted that students from upper classes have higher chances of having an urban background. 131 It is therefore reasonable to expect that "urban elites" are less likely to radicalize compared to other sections of the JNU population.
Atheists are 26 percentage points more likely to be politically radical compared to Hindus, but we do not consider a causal link between the two variables because it is quite plausible that there is a common cause for both self-placing in Figure 1 . The relationship between predicted probability of being in the radical category and the variables of interest.
left fringes of the political spectrum and defining oneself as atheist. There are also differences in terms of school type: School of Social Sciences (SSS) students are more likely to perceive themselves as radicals than School of International Studies (SIS) and Combined Schools (CS) students. Foreign students are less likely to be radical than any other type of admission students.
The effect of time spent as a JNU student remains robust to different model specifications. Even when we control for age, the effect of time spent at JNU remains positive and statistically significant. When we move toward different restricted models, the number of semesters at JNU remains always positive and statistically significant. We only present results for our selected model in Table 7 because we consider this model as the most theoretically informed way of modelling the data generation process in our case. The model also performs best in comparison with alternative ones in terms of Akaike information criterion (AIC) and Bayesian information criterion (BIC) criteria. However, the full model leads to a substantial decline in number of observations due to listwise deletion of missing observations. Consequently, it causes wider confidence intervals even though the estimated coefficients and marginal effects do not change substantially. Restricted models return similar predicted probabilities for being a radical, when we consider the effect of semesters of study but with considerably shorter confidence intervals than presented in Figure 1 . For alternative model specifications and unrestricted models, please see the additional online Appendix.
Next, we measure our dependent variable, political radicalization, as an ordinal variable (see Table 4 ). Higher numbers in the radicalization variable show higher distance from the center of the political spectrum. We use the same model specification strategy. These results are in line with the previous results for dichotomous measurement of radicalization. The coefficient for semesters of study at JNU is positive and statistically significant (p < 0.01) (see Table 8 ). The average marginal effect of variables of interest are presented at Table 9 .The predicted probability of being in the Full Centrist category is around 0.33 for students who have started their first semester at JNU, but it substantially drops as the semesters of study increase. For students who have spent 8 semesters at JNU, the predicted probability of being in the Full Centrist category drops to 0.26.
As a student spends more and more semesters at JNU, his or her probability of being in the "Extreme Radical" category increases. The predicted probability of being in the Extreme Radical category is 0.07 for those who are in their first semester at JNU. This probability increases to 0.12 after spending 8 semesters. Students who reside on-campus, on average, are more likely to be in a more radical category. Overall, statistical analysis suggests strong support for our first hypothesis; exposure to the JNU campus is associated with an increased likelihood of political radicalization.
Membership to a political organization
We claim that exposure to the JNU campus increases the likelihood of membership to a political organization. This hypothesis is tested using the dichotomous Membership variable, which records whether the respondent is a member of a political organization. We use the same model specification as we think that this specification is the most theoretically informed one. The result for logistic regression on Membership is presented in Table 10 . We estimate the average marginal effect of every additional semester at JNU on the likelihood of membership to a political organization is 2 percentage points. Similarly, residing in on-campus accommodation increases the probability of being a member of a political organization by 0.13, on average. Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01. ** p < 0.05. * p < 0.1.
Again, results are robust to different model specifications. Even controlling for age does not substantially change this result, as our main explanatory variable remains positive and statistically significant. We find no relationship between membership to a political organization and caste, parent's level of study, gender, urban/rural background, and degree of enrollment. There is no difference between enrollment in SSS, SIS and SL in terms of the likelihood of affiliation to a political organization, but students of CS are less likely to become members of a political organization compared to SSS and SL.
The limited affiliation levels of CS students might be partly because of the remote location of their academic buildings within the JNU campus, which reduces exposure to the political environment of the campus. Atheists and Muslims are more likely to be affiliated to an organization than Hindus. Additionally, students from the North East (i.e., the eastern-most region of India) are less likely to be politically affiliated than those who were born in the rest of North India. This probably indicates a lack of social integration to broader political activities in the JNU campus.
It should be noted that the statistical model is likely to overestimate the true effect of exposure to the JNU campus on membership to a political organization because students might be less likely to become a member of any organization when they have recently settled for their studies. Only after spending some time, students make social connections, which might influence their likelihood of membership to any social association. In addition, students who become members of a political organization may also become more likely to prefer staying at JNU for further study (e.g. post-graduate study) due to their close social ties at JNU. Such a censoring mechanism may also contribute to the generation of the data we observe.
Overall, the statistical result on membership is far from conclusive. We acknowledge that this model does not uncover a causal link between exposure to the JNU campus and membership to a political organization in itself. However, coupled with the ethnographic study and our other statistical inference, the model on membership to a political organization paints a more complete picture. This result is in line with our other empirical findings, and it fits into the general framework provided by the ethnographic study. 
Participation in political events
We hypothesize that exposure to the JNU campus increases the frequency of participation in political events. We test this hypothesis through ordinal logit on the Participation variable, which categorizes respondents into five categories from no participation to always/daily participation. The results are presented in Table 11 and in Figure 2 . Our main explanatory variables, semesters at JNU and residence on campus, are positive and significant (p < 0.01), suggesting that participation in political events become more likely as a student is more exposed to the JNU campus. Again, this finding is robust to different model specifications, including controlling for respondents' age (see Table 12 ). Standard errors in parentheses. *** p < 0.01. ** p < 0.05. * p < 0.1.
We do not find any evidence that admission status influences participation in political events. Similarly, we find no effect for parent's study level and the degree of enrollment. 132 Females, however, are considerably less likely to participate in political events. On average, the predicted probability of being in the highest two participation categories is 0.12 lower for females than males. This result also fits well with the established literature on gender and politics in India, which highlights the gender bias in Indian politics. 133 Respondents from rural and sub-urban backgrounds are more likely to participate in political events compared to respondents with an urban background. Students enrolled in CS are less likely to participate in political events than students of SSS, but we do not find any difference between SSS and SIS and between SSS and SL. Those who identified themselves as atheists are more likely to participate than Hindus, which is compatible with our results regarding political radicalization. A negative coefficient suggests that Muslims are less likely to participate than Hindus but the result is statistically insignificant. Our results suggest that birthplace of the respondent is not very influential on the frequency of participation.
Conclusion
We have argued that continuous interactions between political activists and newcomer students across JNU student communities do prompt a political socialization process in which newcomer students become more and more politicized, if not themselves versed in political activism. The recent broadbased mobilization of students in JNU after the arrest -on charges of sedition -of the Students' Union President and two other student activists, 134 can be seen in line with the finding of this article. Further research will assess whether peer-to-peer value-based politicization of youth is found pervasive in other premium universities, as suggested by the recent occurrence of several campusbased mobilizations -i.e., the Hokkolorob movement, 135 "FTII protest," 136 Rohith Vemula agitation, 137 and various antimoral policing initiatives around the country. 138 As an interrelated finding, our analysis indicates that while campus politics is mainly informed by dynamics of social relations, the latter are not chiefly manifested in the assertion of caste and class identities. This result contrasts with most political accounts of educational institutions in Uttar Pradesh, 139 Tamil Nadu, 140 and across India in general in which the relevance of caste identities and caste-based politics is far from obsolete. Such a result does not mean, however, that these identities are unimportant parameters, irrelevant to the political grammar of student organizations in JNU. For instance, fieldwork evidence suggests that caste is one of the factors determining the selection of candidates for student elections. It also orients to a certain extent the content of campaigning political messages addressed to individual students.
Nevertheless, the article indicates that activist groups are capable of drawing students from different horizons into politics -even though students from elite backgrounds show less interest in political participation. While caste is not a crucial explanatory factor driving youth political participation in JNU, caste identities presumably remain important as students' political commitments are understood and negotiated differently according to one's background. Significantly, student politics on campus is led by a section of the student population member of political organizations that are regional in their composition and affiliated to broader Indian parties.
One limitation of our study is worth underlining; our empirical results are based on a single case study. Although JNU is a crucial case as a flagship university and a standard bearer of student politics in India, we caution the reader not to hastily generalize our findings beyond the context of JNU at this stage of research. 141 What is needed are cross-case studies that exploit variations at the subnational level, while assessing both the contributions of elite and nonelite universities in the shaping of political values and activist careers. Further research would also benefit from adopting a longitudinal approach. Following participants over several years, especially after graduation and into adulthood, would enable us to see whether political socialization has a lasting effect.
Keeping these two limitations in mind, we suggest that the originality of the paper is twofold. First, JNU presents a "most likely case" within which political socialization is not drawn along caste and class lines. Such socialization, based on the passing down of political knowledge from older activist cohorts to younger ones, overrides in part caste and class alignments by drawing into politics students who have inherited different parental political views and are from eclectic socio-economic backgrounds. As these are the factors that are overwhelmingly emphasized by the extant literature on youth politics in India, we appear to present a valuable counterpoint to the dominant understanding.
Second, this is the first attempt to measure the effect of campus presence on reshaping one's political identity in the Indian context. We consider this research endeavor as a necessary step to situate Indian student politics on the global map of studies on youth politics. While interrogating some commonly accepted patterns of Indian youth politics, the article shows that the case of JNU student politicization conforms to the causal framework described in the wider literature, namely that elite institutions in the social sciences tend to favor the emergence of political activism.
